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William G. Thomas, 111" 
William Jennings Bryan, the 
Railroads, and the Politics 
of "Workingmen" 
Early in his career as a lawyer William Jennings Bryan took a 
principled position that set him apart from many of his colleagues a t  
the bar. When he teamed up with Dolph Talbot in a law practice in 
Lincoln in 1887, the state was growing faster than any other in the 
nation in that decade, catapulting from 450,000 residents to over 1 
million. I t  was a promising field for the law business by any measure. 
Talbot took on a wide spectrum of clientele and represented the Mis- 
souri Pacific Railroad, but Bryan refused "to accept money from a rail- 
road company."l This in itself was remarkable, as attorneys in fast- 
growing towns and cities across the west and south vied for the oppor- 
tunity to claim such a steadily lucrative client. The list of prominent 
railroad attorneys who made their way into politics was long and dis- 
tinguished, from Abraham Lincoln of Illinois to Thomas S. Martin of 
Virginia. As the bar became increasingly professionalized, and a t  the 
same time increasingly split between trial and corporate lawyers even 
in the small towns and cities of the west, Bryan stood squarely on the 
side opposed to the corporation. His law practice featured a handful of 
cases in which he opposed the railroads-a tort case representing a 
seven-year-old girl struck by a Missouri Pacific train in Lincoln, a case 
for a contractor who had put a lien on the railroad company for pay- 
ment of services, and a case involving the validity of votes to move a 
county seat from one railroad line to another. Bryan, it seemed, went 
O Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. 
* John and Catherine Angle Professor in the Humanities a t  the University of Ne- 
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Nebraska School of Law conference on the modern legacy of William Jennings 
Bryan and as  commentary on Michael Kazin's A Godly Hero:The Life of William 
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out of his way to maintain his political purity and to keep his distance 
from the largest special interests of the day-the railroads.2 
Later, in his political career, Bryan tried to turn this principled 
position into a virtue and a t  key moments took a vigorous stand 
against the railroads. His opposition to the railroads, it turns out, was 
remarkably consistent, and throughout his career he tried to focus 
widespread resentment against the big corporations into meaningful 
political change and greater economic opportunity for working people. 
After a trip to Europe in 1906, he was so impressed with the efficiency 
of government-run rail that he came back convinced the United States 
should make the railroads a publicly owned enterprise, a stance he 
had avoided earlier. Indeed, he quickly backed away from this idea 
only to return to it again in 1919. The railroads and the corporate 
power they symbolized were a political lodestar for Bryan, guiding his 
course through decades of his political life, a reference point again and 
again to gain his bearings on the problem of economic and social jus- 
tice for the laboring classes. The political problem Bryan faced 
throughout his career was how to confront the railroads successfully, 
for after all they were, in effect, both the engine of corruption and the 
engine of growth. 
Michael Kazin's biography of Bryan, A Godly Hero: The Life of Wil- 
liam Jennings Bryan, views Bryan more as a progressive reformer 
than as a populist crusader. Kazin's central concern is to recover 
Bryan from the devastating obituary written by H.L. Mencken, who 
presented Bryan as a vestige of an earlier era, little more than a hap- 
less hick bumbling about in the modern world.3 Kazin, on the other 
hand, allows Bryan to stand as a transitional figure to the modern era 
in both his Christian liberalism and his progressive vision for the po- 
litical economy. Despite his arrogant refusal to take railroad clients 
and his long flirtation with populism, Bryan was no throwback. He 
made a concerted attempt throughout his career to resolve a very 
modern problem-how to realign the Democratic Party so that it  rep- 
resented the broad working and middle classes in an  aggressively 
growth-oriented political economy. 
2. See generally Andrew B. Koszewski, William Jennings Bryan's Law Practice in 
Nebraska, 1887-1891 (1991) (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Nebraska- 
Lincoln) (on file with author). On the growth of the law business in the west, see 
Kelly Paulson, Lawyers and the American West: An Empirical Investigation into 
the Components of Demand for Legal Services from 1850 to 1930 (May 4, 2005) 
(unpublished Honors Thesis, Stanford University) (on file with author). On the 
South and the separation of the law business in this period, see WILLIAM G. 
THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW 
SOUTH (Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 
3. &IN, supra note 1, at 298-99. H.L. Mencken, Bryan, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, 
July 27, 1925. 
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The full dimensions of this problem became widely apparent in 
Bryan's 1894 campaign for the United States Senate when, a t  the 
height of railroad abuse and power and in the midst of a crippling 
depression, Bryan ran against John M. Thurston, the Union Pacific's 
general counsel. In many ways, the 1894 Senate campaign in Ne- 
braska became a dress rehearsal for the presidential run two years 
later. In his Senate campaign, Bryan began his move to pull populist 
energy into the Nebraska Democratic Party and faced the counter- 
vailing and contradictory politics presented by the "railroad problem." 
The line between populist demagogue (or "class warfare") and fair de- 
bate over economic issues has been a thin one ever since Bryan's cam- 
paign. Bryan confronted politically active economic interests (the 
railroads) aligned with the Republican Party, as well as a Republican 
Party adapting its rhetoric to defend the "workingman" in a modern 
economy. Gender was especially important in shaping these political 
confrontations, as  Republicans confronted Bryan's democratic/popu- 
lism with arguments linking their party through the tariff and other 
policies to the interests of workingmen, the benefits of railroad 
growth, and the values (such as manhood) inherent in Civil War ser- 
vice. The dilemma Bryan faced was how to attract the votes of work- 
ingmen and get them to vote in their "class interestsn without crossing 
an arbitrary line into so-called "class warfare" or demagoguery.* 
Bryan found the modern, railroad-driven economy morally prob- 
lematic. He was not alone, of course. Henry Adams once remarked, 
"The generation between 1865 and 1895 was already mortgaged to the 
railways, and no one knew it better than the generation itself."s Ad- 
ams could see that railroads were "but one active interest, to which all 
others were subservient, and which absorbed the energies of some 
sixty million people to the exclusion of every other force, real or imagi- 
nary."6 They seemed, in other words, to pull everything and everyone 
into their orbit. 
Earlier generations of Americans applauded the railroad, indeed 
had chanted its arrival as  synonymous with civilization. Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, in Uncle Tom's Cabin, used railroads as a proxy for 
everything modern and advanced about the country, ignoring along 
4. For an overview of the political currents in this period and the new historical 
approaches to them, see THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian Zelizer, 
eds., Princeton University Press, 2003), especially REBECCA EDWARDS, "Domestic- 
ity versus Manhood Rights: Republicans, Democrats, and 'Family Values' Polit- 
ics, 1856-1896," in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 175. On gender and the politics 
of this period, there is a large amount of literature. See, e.g., REBECCA EDWARDS, 
ANGELS IN THE MACHINERY: GENDER IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS FROM THE CIVIL 
WAR TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
5. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 240 (1918). 
6. Id. at 330. 
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the way the fact that the South was laying track with slave labor as 
fast as the North was with free. "lU]nsophisticatedn places, she wrote, 
were those "where there are no railroads."7 Walt Whitman extolled 
the democratic promise of the technology: "Type of the modern-em- 
blem of motion and power-pulse of the continent. . . . Law of thyself 
complete, thine own track firmly holding. . . Launch'd o'er the prairies 
wide, across the lakes, [tlo the free skies unpent and glad and 
strong."8 
Railroads did appear to be a "law unto themselves." They defied 
conventional restraints of power and speed and, in so doing, recon- 
figured the experience of time and space. Their effect was so 
profound, so pervasive, that even those places without them in the 
nineteenth century conformed to railroad time and railroad space. 
The nearly ubiquitous nineteenth-century observation to capture this 
effect was that railroads "annihilated space and time."g The rapid ad- 
vance of technology inspired trepidation and awe, fear and admira- 
tion, anxiety and confidence. Americans felt the need to make an 
accommodation to the railroads-to reconcile the losses (peace and re- 
pose turned into ugly landscapes, noise, and smoke) with the progres- 
sive force of the machinery (harmony, civilization, and 
advancement). 10 
After the Civil War, however, doubts about the railroads wafied in 
the political, social, and intellectual air like the thick smoke from their 
stacks, and in Bryan's day the railroads had become simultaneously 
the means of national, regional, and local vitality and the symbols of 
corruption, dependency, subservience, and monopoly. The scandal of 
the Union Pacific's subsidiary Credit Mobilier in 1872-1873 tarnished 
the nation's premier railroad project.11 The strike of 1877 sounded 
other alarms, as middle-class Americans feared what the railroads 
seemed to have made possible: a mass social protest rooted in eco- 
nomic inequality, inflamed by corporate callousness, and spread 
across the very rail network Americans thought would bind the nation 
together.12 
7. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 283 (The Library of America, 
1982) (1852). 
8. WALT WHITMAN, TO a Locomotive in Winter, in LEAVES OF GRASS 253 (Doubleday, 
1923) (1891-1892). 
9. LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL 
IN AMERICA 194. (Oxford University Press, 1964); WOLFGANG S C H ~ L B U S C H ,  T E
RAILWAY JOURNEY: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PERCEPTION F TIME AND SPACE (Uni- 
versity of California Press, 1986). 
10. For a thorough history of railroad law, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND 
AMERICAN LAW (2001). 
11. See Richard White, Information, Markets, and Corruption: Transcontinental 
Railroads in the Gilded Age, 90 J. AM. HIST. 19 (2003). 
12. On the strike see ROBERT V. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE (1959); PHILIP S. 
FONER, THE GREAT LABOR UPRISING OF 1877 (1977); WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZ 
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By the turn of the century, one of the nation's most prominent and 
accomplished economists, Balthasar Henry Meyer, concluded that the 
railroads touched every aspect of American life. "The introduction of 
railways," he cautioned, "created a new world. So accustomed have we 
become to a civilization with railways that it requires conscious efforts 
to realize the economic, social, political and moral influences which 
have emanated from thern."ls I t  seemed staggering to him that the 
railroad corporations paid in dividends the equivalent of two dollars 
per year for every person living in the United States. Of course, these 
dividends went not to the mass of citizens but to the small fraction of 
Americans who were stockholders. He noted, furthermore, that mod- 
ern nation-states were using the railroad technologies for geopolitical 
purposes-Russia, for example, was building railroads to secure the 
"permanent control of Manchuria."l4 Meyer concluded that to achieve 
social progress, the railroads needed a "harness" and, as he put it, 
"this harness is the law."15 
Despite Meyer's confidence in the law, fitting it to harness the rail- 
roads would not prove easy. The crisis that both he and Henry Adams 
saw was one that we are familiar with today-the consequences of 
what we loosely call "globalization"-and it was exceedingly difficult 
to constrain through the law. We can draw some parallels between 
the 1890s and the 1990s in this regard. Sweeping changes in technol- 
ogy, in the alignment of capital markets, in the expansive competition 
of nation-states, and in the consolidation of big businesses contributed 
to both severe dislocation and extraordinary profitability. Barriers be- 
tween markets collapsed; time and space were reconfigured. Histo- 
rian Robert Schwartz has called this period the "first globalization 
crisis" for England and France, as these changes affected rural migra- 
tion patterns, agricultural production, urban development, and politi- 
cal party formation.16 
Bryan faced similarly sweeping currents in Nebraska. The rail- 
roads were responsible, for example, for virtually shutting down the 
ING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1995); SHELTON STROMQUIST, A GENER- 
ATION OF BOOMERS: THE P A ~ E R N  OF RAILROAD LABOR CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH- 
CENTURY AMERICA (1987); DAVID 0. STOWELL, STREETS, RAILROADS AND THE 
GREAT STRIKE OF 1877 (1999). 
13. BALTHASAR HENRY MEYER, RAILWAY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1903). 
14. Id. at 5. 
15. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
16. Robert Schwartz, Presentation at the American Historical Association Confer- 
ence: Railways, Uneven Geographic Development, and a Crisis of Globalization 
in France and Britain, 1830-1914 (Jan. 2007). See also, Sven Beckert, Emancipa- 
tion and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the 
Age of the American Civil War, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 1405 (2004) (for an analysis of 
global markets); Sven Beckert, From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom 
in the Empire of Cotton, 92 J. AM. HIST. 498 (2005) (also discussing global 
markets). 
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wheat and small grain economy of the middle-Atlantic states when the 
big farms of Illinois, Indiana, and eventually Minnesota and Nebraska 
came on line. Whole regional economies collapsed, and new ones de- 
veloped in the wake of railroad extension. The railroads, in effect, be- 
gan a process of market extension across boundaries, of market 
change both positive and negative, of interstate and multinational cor- 
porations, and of special interest involvement in politics. In addition 
to all of these, they shaped and sustained cultural ideas about space 
and gender; work and family; and liberty and citizenship.17 
Obviously, one of the great concerns of nineteenth-century Ameri- 
cans was the unprecedented size and power of these companies. The 
railroads in the 1890s were being consolidated and merged, as court 
appointed receivers attempted to reconstitute the companies out of the 
wreckage of the 1893 depression. The resulting systems, financed 
largely by J.P. Morgan, were, in the words of the day, "colossal" or 
"gigantic" enterprises. When the Southern Railway, for example, 
emerged out of the defunct Richmond Terminal system, the Omaha 
Bee could not help but take notice. The system amassed over 4,500 
miles of track, and the Omaha Bee warned Southern states that they 
would need "stronger governmental regulation to hold the railroads 
within their legitimate spheren and that they would "soon appreciate 
the burden of railroad domination which the western states are now 
trying to lift."ls 
If the scale of these companies was a concern, then their cozy rela- 
tionship with government officials cast serious doubt on the idea of 
ever containing them to a "legitimate sphere." When President Cleve- 
land, for example, hopped on the private car of the president of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad to go on fishing trips to the Chesapeake Bay's 
eastern shore, eyebrows (Republican and Democrat) all over the coun- 
try were raised. Cleveland began his first term with a vow to pay his 
own way on the railroads, though he soon accepted free rides from the 
companies. Benjamin Harrison, his successor in the Oval Office, 
firmly resisted luxury trip offers. The Omaha Bee reported that the 
Pennsylvania's presidential car was Cleveland's "favorite vehicle" and 
it is easy to see why. The interior of the car was "a dream of beauty 
and luxury."lg I t  came with a "cook's store room, which contains the 
17. On the globalization and modernity railroads helped create, see, e.g., IAN CLARK, 
GLOBABLIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL RE ATIONS IN THE TWENTI- 
ETH CENTURY (1997); JORGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZA- 
TION: A SHORT HISTORY (2005); ERIC RAUCHWAY, BLESSED AMONG NATIONS: HOW 
THE WORLD IVIADE AMERICA (2006). On gendered spaces and the railroads, see 
AMY RICHTER, HOME ON THE RAILS: WOMEN, THE RAILROAD, AND THE RISE OF PUB- 
LIC DOMESTICITY (2005); WELKE, BARBARA, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GEN- 
DER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001). 
18. A Colossal Railway Consolidation, OMAHA BEE, September 6, 1894, at 4. 
19. Cleveland$ Private Car, OMAHA BEE, September 6, 1894, at 4. 
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rarest delicacies of the table and the finest of wines . . . a wide, roomy 
bed chamber, bath room, literary and observation room."20 Cooks, 
servants, and "nimble-fingered attendants" traveled with the car, and 
the car arrived in Washington fully stocked whenever Cleveland re- 
quested it. This controversy, over what was called "deadheading," 
symbolized the insidious power of the largest railroads to corrupt the 
highest levels of government. When Cleveland sent federal troops to 
Chicago in July 1894 to enforce court injunctions against striking rail- 
road workers, few were surprised.21 
The Omaha Bee considered itself a kind of watchdog over corporate 
power and political corruption, and by the 1890s its editor, Edward 
Rosewater, became the leading Republican voice for railroad reform in 
Nebraska. However, the problem of the railroads, indeed the problem 
of the trusts, was not a simple matter of specific issues, such as high 
rates or rebates on railroads. "It is striking that Bryan's middle-class 
followers," Michael Kazin noted, "spent little time railing against the 
trusts; their letters and memoirs include few specific protests against 
a big business that injured their dignity or threatened their economic 
independence. Far more salient was their desire for a moral alterna- 
tive to the corporate order as a whole."22 Bryan's middle-class follow- 
ers, of course, were also the least likely to be threatened in direct ways 
by the trusts, though, like Henry Adams, they too may have felt "mort- 
gaged" to them. The important point here is that Bryan tried to artic- 
ulate a moral alternative, while he simultaneously appealed to those 
directly affected by the changing nature of the railroad-based 
As a Democratic political candidate, Bryan naturally opposed any 
form of special advantages for corporations. In this respect, he was 
not far from the convictions of the Nebraska Democratic leader, J. 
Sterling. Morton. whose brand of democratic conservativism was - 
strictly laissez-faire. He opposed subsidies for corporations as  much 
as he did overregulation. "Railroads born before their time," Morton 
explained a t  a centennial address in 1876 in Nebraska City, 
are commercial deformities-monetary monsters which first consume the sub- 
stance of the people, and then turn upon their proprietors to rend and destroy 
them also. Physical deformities are incarnate protestations against violations 
of natural laws; and commercial boa-constrictors in the form of railroads, 
through peopleless and cropless counties, are denunciations of the policy 
which donates into life railroads before there is anything legitimate for rail- 
roads to do.24 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. KAZIN, supm note 1, at 214. 
23. Id. 
24. J. STERLING MORTON, A COMMEMORATIVE PAMPHLET 23 (1876). 
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Morton crusaded against the idea that western settlers had "made 
something out of nothing." All such speculative building and fi- 
nance-whether of railroads, towns, or crops-was, he thought, 
shameful and unnatural. By the time of his campaign for the U.S. 
Senate in 1894, Bryan had already begun to veer off from Morton's 
conservative democratic principles against interference in the econ- 
omy and to head into murky and uncharted waters for his party, but 
his essential argument against the railroads echoed much of what 
Morton had said earlier. 
So, in the fall of 1894, William Jennings Bryan found himself in 
the fight of his young political career. He had resigned his seat in the 
U.S. House and was seeking election to the United States Senate. He 
faced John M. Thurston, a railroad attorney for the Union Pacific, an 
experienced Republican leader, a close associate of James G. Blaine, 
and a formidable debater. Thurston not only was a Union Pacific law- 
yer, but also was an  appointed receiver for the bankrupted railroad. 
In 1893, Thurston considered putting himself forward as a possible 
U.S. Senate candidate, but he stepped out of the race to concentrate on 
his law practice with the Union Pacific. Despite his public with- 
drawal, desperate Nebraska Republicans in 1893 still tried to elect 
him, but they lost in the legislature when, in a remarkable move, 
Democrats and Populists succeeded in electing William V. Allen to the 
U.S. Senate, the first non-Republican ever elected to the Senate in Ne- 
braska. So, in 1894, Republicans knew that they needed Thurston, 
and they turned to him to carry the campaign against the Democrats 
and Populists.25 
As the campaign got underway, the editor of the republican Omaha 
Bee, Edward Rosewater, broke with the Republicans whom he consid- 
ered bought by the railroads. Rosewater was a longtime opponent of 
monopolies and railroads, and he generally hoped to thwart John 
Thurston's brand of business republicanism.26 He had opposed the 
nomination of Chauncey M. Depew for president in 1888, while Thur- 
ston backed him. The potential nomination of Depew, a railroad direc- 
tor on the Vanderbilt's New York Central lines. seemed to some 
Republicans a betrayal of a "sacred trust" to represent the working 
people. The Chicago Daily Tribune backed Rosewater, claiming that 
the party that had for its mission the relief of the oppressed of all races; that 
gave free homes to millions of the homeless; that struck the shackles from the 
limbs of four millions of slaves; that made the poorest laborer the peer of the 
.- - -- 
25. Senator Allen from Nebraska: End of the Long Fight by the Election of a Populist, 
NEW YORK TIMES,  Feb. 8, 1893. 
26. For some of the background on Rosewater and Republican infighting, see Re- 
signed in Dudgeon: Editor Rosewater Bolts the Nomination of Majors, WASHING 
TON POST, Aug. 23, 1894, at 1. 
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millionaire, cannot and must not stultify itself by kneeling at the shrine of 
railroad billionaires.27 
After years of determined and tough infighting and even tougher 
struggles in 1894 a t  the state convention, Rosewater bitterly stepped 
down from the Republican National Committee and issued a stinging 
letter of resignation. He accused the Nebraska Republicans of turning 
the Capitol building into a "den of debaucheries" and selling out to 
corporate interests. The convention delegates cheered loudly a t  the 
news of Rosewater's resignation and quickly elected John M. Thurston 
to the National Committee in his place. 
The 1894 Nebraska Republican Party platform called for some sen- 
sible adjustments to curb railroad power, such as the enforcement of a 
maximum rate act and a constitutional bar on fictitious, over-capital- 
ized companies. Nevertheless, Rosewater fumed that the Burlington 
Railroad had bribed party delegates to nominate Thomas Majors for 
governor, a state delegate, he charged, "who has for years consorted 
only with railroad ringsters and boodle state officials."28 Majors, he 
wrote, had "been the pliant tool of the railroads in season and out of 
season" and was nominated "by the combined influence of corporate 
cappers, professional bribe-givers, jury-hers, and impeached State 
House officials."zg Majors was popular and known widely as "Blue 
Shirt" Majors, because he always appeared in public clad in blue to 
emphasize his Civil War service in the First Nebraska Volunteers. 
Majors claimed to represent the farmers, the average Republicans, 
and the soldiers of the Civil War. Rosewater depicted himself as a 
crusader for the rights and interests of the "workingman" against the 
big corporate power that he saw infecting the democratic process, and 
a voice of true republican principles. "There is an old German adage," 
he warned, "if you go to bed with dogs, you are sure to get up with 
fleas."30 So, Rosewater put a notice in the Omaha Bee: "All Republi- 
cans who are opposed to the domination of railroads and desire to re- 
sent the attempt to make the party subservient to corporate 
monopolies and public thieves" were invited to write him.31 
And they did. All sorts of opinions came from around Nebraska. 
Rosewater probably published them all. One wrote of the "brass col- 
lar" that the Burlington fitted around Lancaster County, another of 
the "monopoly ridden . . . gang of pirates" in the party hierarchy, an- 
other of railroad employees instructed by the executives on who they 
27. Nebraska Republicans Will Kick: Protest of the Omaha "Bee"Against Threatened 
Monopoly Leadership, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, June 13, 1888, at 7. 
28. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 29, 1894 at 4. 
29. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 28, 1894 at 4. 
30. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 24, 1894, at 4; Where Nebraska Stands, CHICAGO 
DAILY TRIBUNE, June 7, 1892 at 1. 
31. To Nebraska Republicans, OMAHA BEE, August 26, 1894, at 12. 
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should vote for in no uncertain terms.32 Rosewater's Republican oppo- 
sition to the power of the railroads focused mainly on their political 
corruption. But he noted that every good or service in America de- 
pended on them and the result was that a fraction of everything 
bought and sold in the United States went to the railroads. "Every 
person in the United States-native, naturalized, alien, sojourner, or 
traveler-pays tribute, directly or indirectly, to our railroads, every 
day," Rosewater emphasized, wrapping his argument in outrage a t  the 
dependence and subservience that railroads seemed to cause wherever 
they were extended.33 Not all Nebraska Republicans appreciated 
Rosewater's righteous indignation. The Nebraska State Journal saw 
Rosewater as  motivated by nothing more than a personal vendetta 
against the Republican gubernatorial candidate. 
r-  -- -... -... -, ----"- 
--.--- .. -1--- - -  ..-. d --.--.-. ., -.... -. .i=X LlE (EHY(!RjTI[IS \~~[fl~~]~,:-.~z--:::~;~:zz;~:::-:.~?:--=::::~.r~~ -- - . .- , . ,. .- - !:it! HlU3'nl , :OX. ..-. s . 
Republican editor Edward Rosewater emerged as the leading anti-railroad voice in the 
Nebraska Senate election of 1894 between William Jennings Bryan and John M. Thur- 
ston. Source: Omaha Bee, November 3, 1894 at 1. 
At the same time, Rosewater and Bryan, as editors and leading 
voices against railroad involvement in politics, applauded the chang- 
ing economy that the railroads made possible. They covered the do- 
- -- 
32. What Shall We Do To Be Saved, O ~ A  BEE, September 8, 1894, at 1. 
33. Railroads and the People, 0- BEE, Sept. 16, 1894, at 13. 
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ings of the railroad business, the "railroad gossip," the comings and 
goings of the railroad men, the changing dynamics of the region's ser- 
vice. The railroad seemed to sustain and-in many arenas of opera- 
tion-to cultivate an expansive culture of workingmen and families: 
family travel and excursions, middle-class domesticity and gender val- 
ues, independent laborers, and ideas about progress. 
More than this, expanding the railroad system was championed 
not feared, even in the depression, as furthering national, regional, 
and local progress. When the Burlington line opened a new road into 
Wyoming and Montana that joined the Northern Pacific, Rosewater 
was full of praise and excitement for the same nefarious corporation 
he railed against day after day for its political corruption. The new 
route ran from Sheridan, Wyoming, to Billings, Montana. Its opening 
reconfigured the position of Omaha and Lincoln on a changing map of 
linked economies. Figuratively speaking, their "location" changed 
with the opening of this new route, but few thought of these matters in 
figurative terms-such changes were considered quite literal. "The 
building of this line is of incalculable benefit to Omaha, Kansas City, 
St. Louis, Chicago, bringing a territory of some 1,500 miles in extent 
almost to the doors of these cities," Rosewater exclaimed.34 It  was, in 
effect, a drastic short cut to the Northwest shaving off 295 miles of a 
trip from Omaha to Helena, 385 miles off the trip to Spokane. The 
consequences were that a region that had been a "sealed book" to 
wholesalers in the Missouri Valley was now opened, and what had 
been a "monopoly" controlled by St. Paul and Minneapolis was "now 
for the first time brought into civilization's rim."35 The agent of all 
this progress was, of course, the "progressive pioneer methods of the 
Burlington system of rails."36 The fact that the system now encom- 
passed nearly 7,000 miles was not considered a threat in this context 
but a great advantage.37 
With the republican press in Omaha giving the loudest and clear- 
est voice against the trusts and their political corruption but simulta- 
neously opposing the Democrats and Populists, Bryan faced a difficult 
situation. Early in the campaign, as early as June, Bryan's Republi- 
can opposition focused on the "fanaticism" of Bryan's stand on the "sil- 
ver question."38 And although the Omaha Bee would not publicly 
endorse John Thurston, it did not actively oppose him either. 
34. Through Historic Fields, OMAHA BEE, Oct. 29, 1894, at 8. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. See also Makes Work for Railroads, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 29, 1894, at 7 (discuss- 
ing Union Pacific's advantage over slower, southern routes). 
38. Nebraskan Republican League: In Convention at Lincoln the Silver Difficulty is 
Neatly Avoided, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 13, 1894, at 1. 
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The most dramatic events of the 1894 campaign were without 
question the two joint debates between Bryan and Thurston, a senato- 
rial square off that seemed to many observers to approach the na- 
tional scale and importance of the Lincoln-Douglas debates half of a 
century earlier. Seven thousand people attended the first debate, and 
fifteen thousand attended the second. So many people arrived to hear 
the men that the debate was moved from the Opera House in Lincoln 
to the state fair ground's largest building, Mechanical Hall. The Uni- 
versity of Nebraska political clubs turned out in force and local leaders 
presided. Mrs. Bryan and Mrs. Thurston took prominent seats on the 
platform while their husbands stood for the debate. Surprisingly, 
Bryan, the great orator, was outmatched, and Thurston performed 
with a staggeringly effective blend of powerful logic, political savvy, 
and emotional passion. 
Bryan began his address not with the silver issue, nor with rail- 
road political corruption, nor with the "trust problem," but with the 
idea of a federal income tax and with the Democratic Party plank call- 
ing on the government to foreclose its loans to the Pacific railroads as  
soon as they come due. The railroad problem for Bryan was linked not 
so much to corruption but to the question of fairness and opportunity 
for the workingman. Bryan asked who paid the taxes, and then 
pointed out that regressive taxation on liquor and tobacco, and tariff 
duties on everything, made working people pay more for clothes, food, 
and basic necessities. Meanwhile, Bryan implied (without directly ac- 
cusing or naming Thurston or Union Pacific), that the stockholders in 
the Pacific railroads had a privileged position, one that the people, as 
the chartering agent of the railroads, had bestowed upon them. The 
logic of foreclosing on the railroad loans was, it  should be said, some- 
what counterintuitive: Bryan figured that once free of the government 
debt and forced to consolidate, the watered stock would be drained off 
and the railroads' valuation would be more accurate. Bryan pointed 
out that these companies paid out large dividends throughout the loan 
period and yet claimed to be unable to pay the principle and interest 
back to the government on schedule. Because they were overcapital- 
ized and in debt, the railroads charged excessively high rates, and 
Nebraskans paid. "The roads have collected the money and put it 
down in their own pockets," Bryan thundered to great applause, "and 
we deny the justice o f .  . . collect[ing] money a second time from the 
people who have already paid it."39 Extending the loans, Bryan rea- 
soned, would mean only that "the people along the line of the road" 
would be making payments in the higher rates they paid on every- 
thing they shipped.40 
39. The Battle of the Giants, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 18, 1894, a t  2. 
40. Id. 
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Thurston, as anyone might expect of an experienced corporate law- 
yer, did not wilt before the challenge of his opponent, whom he earlier 
lampooned as  "Billy Windmill Bryan." In addresses to local Republi- 
can nominating meetings after all, Thurston ridiculed Bryan's move 
into the newspaper editorial ranks, a t  one point calling him a "puny, 
petty, populistic, political pissmire."41 
In the debates, Thurston was more dignified. His first move was to 
bring up what Bryan left unsaid in his focus on the Pacific railroads- 
that he, Thurston, was in the employ of one of them. Thurston was 
proud of work and claimed he "came across the Missouri river twenty- 
five years ago. . . . without an acquaintance or a friend. . . . an  un- 
known boy."42 He called himself a self-made man who was selected 
"without any solicitation on my part to stand a t  the head of the law 
department of the greatest railway system of the civilized worlden43 
He stated plainly for all to hear that since becoming a candidate for 
the Senate, he had left the Union Pacific and did not represent "a sin- 
gle railway corporation of the earth, a bondholder, a stockholder or 
any other interest therein."44 
Thurston stood before the voters, then, as  the ideal man of Henry 
Adams' railroad generation, one who had searched out and found what 
he was "fit" for. Unlike Bryan who seemed aloof at  times in his un- 
willingness to take railroad clients, Thurston placed himself as part of 
the wide movement of the times in which, as  Henry Adams put it, 
"society dropped every thought of dealing with anything more than 
the single fraction called a railway system."45 And he drew great ap- 
plause with this story of his coming up and his commitment to doing 
his "duty." Thurston depicted himself first and foremost as  a working- 
man, albeit one who had risen to positions of great opportunity and 
authority. 
Thurston then took up the issue of the Pacific roads' mortgages. 
He considered it astounding that Bryan would consider letting the 
railroads off the hook by canceling their loans and quickly pointed out 
just how out of step Bryan was with the conservative members of his 
own party. Bryan, in other words, stood before the voters not only as  
an advocate of silver coinage and monetary inflation, but also of the 
repudiation of debts, a conceptually broader threat to the republic. 
Thurston linked both the silver issue and the tariff issue into a de- 
fense of the working people in a globalized economy arguing that 
Bryan essentially misunderstood the great changes of the age around 
him. "Every laboring man in this union," Thurston claimed, "whether 
41. Thurston on Bryan, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 25, 1894, at 1 
42. The Battle of the Giants, supra note 39, at 2. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. ADAMS, supra note 5, at 240. 
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in the shop, upon the farm, or in the mine, should be protected from 
the competition of the pauper labor of the whole world outside."46 
Thurston hammered the Democrats for the fall in the price of wheat, 
the loss of jobs, and the failure to "take care of American industries."47 
What the American workingman wanted, he said, was work-not free 
silver.48 
The republican Nebraska State Journal, perhaps not surprisingly, 
deemed Thurston's effort "masterly . . . a legal and logical argument 
based on the principles of republicanism."49 Bryan, on the other hand, 
was "eloquent but illogical and inconsistent," mired by the obvious 
chasm between his views and those of the Democratic administration 
in power.50 Bryan committed a grievous political error, the paper 
maintained, when he ignored the heritage of Jefferson and Jackson 
and instead puffed "his ambitious plans for reforming the universe."51 
The Chicago Daily reported that "long-continued cheers" for Thurston 
marked the debate.52 Nearly every paper considered it the greatest 
joint debate in Nebraska history and a harbinger of the coming 1896 
presidential election.53 
Bryan, for his part, shrugged off the accusations after the debate 
that he was a populist demagogue, saying "in these latter days he is a 
statesman whose ear is tuned to catch the slightest pulsation of the 
pocketbook, but he is a demagogue who dares to listen to the heart 
beat of humanity."54 The ease and flippant nature of Bryan's post- 
debate comments hid the depth of the political problem he faced. 
Bryan's oratory in the debate could not overcome the force of Thur- 
ston's argument, and the ways that argument linked workingmen to 
the Republican vision. 
One of the most perceptive summaries of the debates in Bryan's 
Omaha World Herald came from Elia W. Peattie. A journalist and 
writer, Peattie produced a number of travelogues for Rand McNally 
and several American history texts in the early 1890s, as well as a 
collection of gothic short stories, including An Astral Onion and The 
Shape of Fear.55 Peattie was commissioned to cover the debates and 
46. The Battle of the Giants, supra note 39, at 2. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. The Big Debate, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 1. 
50. Id. 
51. Untitled, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 4. 
52. Rivals for a Toga: Thurston and Bryan Engage in Debate in Lincoln, CHICAGO 
DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct. 18, 1894, at 5. 
53. The Big Debate, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 1; The Battle of the 
Giants, supra note 39, at 2; Rivals for a Toga: Thurston and Bryan Engage in 
Debate in Lincoln, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct. 18, 1894, at 5. 
54. Bryan Closes, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 3. 
55. ELIA P E A ~ I E ,  IMPERTINENCES: S LECTED WRITINGS OF ELIA P E A ~ I E ,  A JOURNAL 
IST IN THE GILDED AGE (Susan George Bloomfield ed., 2005). 
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to tell readers ''how a woman viewed it all."56 She pointed out that for 
every fifty men in the audience of fifteen thousand, there was one wo- 
man, but that the women had their own points of view.57 Peattie, 
playing on widely accepted Victorian gender differences, suggested to 
her readers that women made political decisions from the heart and 
not from the brain. Having appealed to the gender conventions of her 
readers, probably in part to disarm them and draw them in, Peattie 
eventually set ''joking aside." "Mr. Thurston looked secretive," she re- 
ported from the smoke filled chamber, "Mr. Bryan frank; Mr. Thur- 
ston was thin, with drooping shoulders; Bryan stalwart, with square 
shoulders, suggestive of protection; Mr. Thurston exceedingly intellec- 
tual, rather cautious, and full of reservation; Mr. Bryan essentially 
candid, very argumentative and fascinatingly impulsive."58 She went 
on to describe Bryan's Jove-like facial features and his "compelling 
magnetism."59 
Peattie cast everything in contrast. Bryan had the "dash and fury 
of youth;" Thurston was tempered by experience. Bryan was a 
prophet; Thurston an advocate. Bryan spoke truths; Thurston old 
platitudes. Peattie went so far as to comment on both men's poor taste 
in fashion, taking them to task for wearing trousers that "bag a t  the 
knees."so Summing it all up, she gave what might be an  enduring 
portrait, when she said, 
Mr. Thurston is a remarkably clever man and a very adroit one. He is past 
master of the art of what not to say. Mr. Bryan has a spark of genius which 
would make any cause popular which he espoused, and which, if he used it as 
a sacred thing, for the good of his fellow man and the glory of God, will yet 
make him one of the great men of the nation.61 
After the debates, the Republicans took out a full-page advertise- 
ment in Bryan's Omaha World Herald and made plain their view of 
what was a t  stake.62 Their argument hinged on the idea of a 
networked economy, an  organic system which Nebraska voters, if mis- 
led by Bryan and his populist\democratic fusion, would easily upset. 
Republicans held that Omaha, Nebraska was built with "muscle, 
money, and mind."63 The workingman provided the muscle, the east- 
ern capitalist the money, and the Nebraska businessmen the mind or 
vision. Harmony among these three would allow the region to grow, 
while a rupture in these relations would injure workingmen and choke 
56. How A Woman Viewed It All, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 21, 1894, at 10. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Railroad Cry, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, NOV. 1,1894, at 4; Good Old Times, OMAHA 
WORLD HERALD, NOV. 2, 1894 at 4. 
63. Railroad Cry, supra note 62, at 4. 
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off growth. The Republicans of 1894 appealed to the "silent" majority 
of voters whose conservativism could be counted on to resist populist 
and democratic excesses.64 
With this logic, the Republicans swept the legislative elections, 
though the election of Thurston to the Senate seat was by no means 
assured. Rivals quickly emerged, including the defeated gubernato- 
rial candidate Tom Majors. Majors' supporters accused Thurston of 
"knifing Majors during the recent campaign."65 Thurston, however, 
was elected to the U.S. Senate by the Republican caucus on January 1, 
1895. 
Thurston outlined for the press "the principles that would govern 
him" in the Senate in a New Year's Day announcement. The railroad 
lawyer quickly took on the mantle of reform and stitched to it a com- 
mitment to workingmen and a thoroughgoing, vibrant Americanism. 
Thurston rattled off a long list of short phrases (sound bites) as  his 
principles: "a free ticket to China for any man who insists upon his 
right to buy the product of human labor without paying a fair price to 
the brain and brawn which produces it;" a one-term presidency; direct 
election of senators; "governmental supervision and control of trans- 
portation lines and rates;" "the protection of the people from unlawful 
combination and unjust exaction of aggregated capital and corporate 
power;" "war on the three great . . . trusts-oil, whisky and sugar;" 
and finally, a thorough American patriotism-"an American flag for 
every American school house."66 Thurston then announced that he 
would retire from any legal work involving railroads. He wanted "to 
relieve the republican party of Nebraska from even the apparent re- 
sponsibility" of electing a bought man.67 
So, Thurston started off the year in 1895 no longer a railroad law- 
yer and, like Theodore Roosevelt later in the presidency, began his 
term in the Senate with an  effort to co-opt key elements of the progres- 
sive reform agenda his opponent William Jennings Bryan had advo- 
cated. He appeared before the Nebraska legislature in mid-January 
to accept its nomination and to outline his views of the coming Con- 
gressional session. Thurston called first and foremost for a tough pro- 
tective tariff. He was convinced that 
the prosperity of this country and its people, especially of the industrial 
masses, depends upon the broadest application of the American idea that 
whatever labor is to be done for the people of the United States shall be done 
by the people of the United States under the Stars and Stripes, and that the 
64. Id.; Good Old Times, supra note 62, at 4 .  
65. The Nebraska Senatorship: Active Rivalry Among Prominent Republicans, WASH- 
INGTON POST, NOV. 22, 1894, at 1. 
66. Senator John M. Thurston: Joint Caucus Ends A11 Speculation, OMAHA BEE, Jan. 
2 ,  1895, at 4. 
67. Id. 
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prices of the products of American labor shall be fixed by American conditions 
and American competition.68 
As a new U.S. Senator, Thurston vaulted into the ranks of Republi- 
can leadership. He served on the National Committee for the GOP 
and attracted the attention of national reporters with his story of suc- 
cess. The Los Angeles Times' Frank G. Carpenter, for example, fea- 
tured him as "the boy hunter of Nebraska" who, like Lincoln, had 
grown up on the prairie "[flishing for pickerel for a living and trapping 
muskrats" to become a successful lawyer.69 He became National 
Party Chairman in 1896 and gave speeches all over the country, in- 
cluding the Cooper Union in New York City. At nearly every venue, 
he delivered "electrifying" speeches and was greeted with loud and 
sustained applause from Republicans in large part because he had be- 
sted Democratic presidential nominee Bryan in the 1894 race.70 
In retrospect, it might seem that Bryan faced an impossible chal- 
lenge in 1894. Michael Kazin's A Godly Hero suggests as much.71 Af- 
ter all, the conventional answer to why Bryan lost might be that 
corporate interests bought the election, as they did a year earlier in 
Virginia where the obscure railroad attorney Thomas Staples Martin 
was elected to the U.S. Senate over the popular former governor Fitz- 
hugh Lee, nephew of Robert E. Lee. The Democrats were divided, 
moreover, with J. Sterling Morton thoroughly opposed to Bryan's alli- 
ance with the populists and his soft money ideas. There was in 1894, 
moreover, a massive depression gripping the nation, and the Demo- 
cratic administration of President Grover Cleveland was widely de- 
spised. As if these strikes against him were not enough, the railroads, 
banks, and insurance companies raised money to support Thurston 
while Bryan's campaign ran out of money.72 
Yet, for all of these obvious advantages, John Thurston saw him- 
self as the underdog. Writing years later in 1915, Thurston main- 
tained that he "plunged into the 1894 contest alone" and that the 
68. Chosen Leaders: John M. Thurston Represents Nebraska, Los ANCELES TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 1895, at 2. See also, JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF QUESTION IN THE 
GILDED AGE: THE GREAT DEBATE OF 1888 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 
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69. Frank G. Carpenter, John M. Thurston: The Boy Hunter of Nebraska in the 
United Stats Senate, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 1895, at 25. 
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Greeted with Great Enthusiasm, Los ANCELES TIMES, July 4,1896, at 4; Thurston 
on the Stump: Nebraskan Starts Ball Rolling at Madison on Friday, CHICAGO 
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Union Pacific did not give him "one dollar."73 Thurston ignored the 
businessmen's associations that mobilized their own money to cam- 
paign on his behalf and instead focused on the statewide campaign 
speeches both he and Bryan made bringing the election of the U.S. 
Senator to the people. He considered himself "elected by the people" 
and thought that many observers underestimated the difficulty he 
faced and the temper of the times. "Nebraska had not had a Republi- 
can legislature for six years," Thurston noted, 
It had been controlled by the forces of the Democratic and Populist parties, 
both of which nominated Mr. Bryan. We had a populist Democratic Governor 
and United States Senator. The prospect of success seemed very small and 
everybody thought I was leading a forlorn hope.74 
Thurston considered his triumph "astounding."75 
- - 
Thurston's memory may have been clouded, but his perspective 
provides a useful lens through which to see Bryan's campaign. His- 
torians have been too quick, perhaps, to excuse Bryan for his political 
losses by suggesting that he was simply up against long odds, that 
powerful forces brought him down, or that his crusades were quixotic. 
At least in 1894 Bryan's campaign was not unreasonable. That he 
failed should not, however, be surprising. Bryan faced an extraordi- 
narily canny, tough, and dedicated opponent in John M. Thurston, 
who was able to articulate a powerful defense of Republicanism for 
workingmen. 
Two years later, in 1896, Thurston campaigned for William McKin- 
ley against Bryan and stumped across the Midwest with his speech 
"To American Workingmen." In attacking Bryan and the silver issue, 
Thurston used the slogan, "a promise of something for nothing is false 
and dangerous to the people."76 Thurston thoroughly dismantled the 
silver question in his long speeches, but he reserved his emotional en- 
ergy for his dismissal of Bryan. "No man who appeals to class 
prejudice," Thurston argued, "who incites the populace to tear down 
those who have succeeded in life; no man who puts sectionalism above 
nationalism, can ever be elected President of the United States."77 It 
was an easy accusation to make, and its logic proved convincing to 
tens of thousands of voters. "Not by tearing down," Thurston cried, 
"but by building up, can the common people share in the blessings of 
American civilization."78 
By the 1890s, railroads penetrated nearly every American commu- 
nity and interlocked them in new system-wide territories. Consolida- 
73. Eva May Fosbury, Biography of John Mellon Thurston 71-72, n.2 (Aug. 1920) 
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tions and mergers helped produce the nation's largest business 
corporations, its largest labor unions, and its largest political move- 
ments. Yet, communities, individuals, and other institutions adopted 
much of the railroad network and attempted to make it their own, a 
process that was as  confusing, and sometimes contradictory, for the 
railroad companies as for the Grangers and the populists. So it was 
that William Jennings Bryan could blast the railroads as agents of 
monopoly and a t  the same time derive his life's income from the lec- 
ture circuit that the railroads' speed and reliability made possible. So 
it was that workingmen might strike against the railroad companies 
and a t  the same time see themselves as its principle agents of growth. 
So it was that editors and middle-class voters might voice objections to 
railroad corruption and a t  the same time champion the largest sys- 
tems in their region. 
The Bryan-Thurston campaign in 1894 signaled the beginning of a 
modern political era and pointed to a challenging political problem: 
the difficulty of confronting the tight relationship of politics and large 
scale business in a time when the society was mortgaged to growth. 
Bryan in 1894 and again in  1896, for all of his appeal, his vigor, his 
youth, and his oratory, was not just facing entrenched interests 
equipped with modern campaign tactics; nor was he simply the voice 
of a group bypassed in the emergent modern economy and so a repre- 
sentative of the end of an era. Bryan's quest was to capture the work- 
ingman's vote that had for decades aligned itself with the Republican 
Party despite that party's leadership and orientation toward big busi- 
ness. Bryan in the strictest terms was not successful, but politics was 
never the same after it.79 
79. On the voting dynamics of the period, see THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William Novak, & Ju- 
lian Zelizer, eds., 2003). See also RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1880-1890 (1984) (discussing political parties 
and sectionalism in the United States); and RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE PO- 
LITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000) (places po- 
litical developments in context during the period of United States 
industrialization). For an overview of the historiography of this issue, see 
HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, orth and West of Reconstruction: Studies in Political 
Economy in RECONSTRUCTIONS: EW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTBELLUM UNITED 
STATES (Thomas J. Brown, ed., 2006). 
